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Australian Shareholders Rejoice:
Current Developments in Australian
Corporate Litigation
By PAUL VON NESSEN *
I. Introduction
Recent cases in the United States and Australia have provided
dramatic evidence of opposing trends in the two countries in regard
to shareholder litigation. In 2007 the United States Supreme Court
case of Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd.' ("Tellabs")
illustrated the difficulty which United States plaintiffs now face in
meeting the threshold requirement for securities class actions, that of
pleading with sufficient particularity the scienter of the defendants to
the action. In the same year, the Australian High Court approved, in
Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif2 ("Fostif"), the use of
funding arrangements for speculative litigation while encouraging
shareholder claims in relation to defective disclosure documents and
failure of continuous disclosure. The Australian High Court did this
by allowing such claims to rank equally with those of other creditors
in Sons of Gwalia Ltd. v. Margaritic.3 ("Sons of Gwalia"). These
decisions, close on the heels of the first steps toward elimination of
historic inhibitors of shareholder actions by the Australian Federal
Court in the Concept Sports case in 2005,' will likely result in
* Professor, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University,
Melbourne, Australia, and Consultant, McCullough Robertson, Lawyers, Brisbane,
Australia. Currently Visiting Professor, School of Law, City University of Hong
Kong.
1. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., No. 06-484, 2007 U.S. LEXIS
8270 (U.S. June 21, 2007); No. 06-484, 2007 U.S. WL 1773208 (U.S. June 21, 2007).
2. Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif (2006) 229 A.L.R. 58.
3. Sons of Gwalia Ltd. v. Margaritic (2007) 232 A.L.R. 232.
4. Cadence Asset Mgmt. Pty Ltd. v. Concept Sports Ltd. (2005) 147 F.C.R. 434.
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significant shareholder litigation in Australia, just as such actions are
being effectively constrained in the United States.
In the United States, the securities class action was an extremely
popular proceeding, enabling shareholders to seek redress for a
number of varied complaints against corporations and their
management Prospectus failures, continuous disclosure failures and
corporate governance deficiencies could all potentially lead to actions
by a group of shareholders with severe consequences for the
corporation and individual directors. Misuse of these actions
eventually led to Congressional intervention to prevent the worst
abuses of class actions in their application to corporate and securities
regulation.6  Tellabs confirms that the new constraints, requiring
potential litigants to plead both the facts alleging securities fraud as
well as the facts evidencing the defendant's intention to deceive,
manipulate and defraud, are particularly effective
On the other hand, shareholder litigation in Australia has
historically faced a number of impediments arising from the
Australian adherence to legal principles which originated in the
United Kingdom, often retaining such legal concepts long after they
were abandoned in the United Kingdom itself. Because certain
features of the Australian legal system (found in much of the
common law world aside from the United States) are not conducive
to speculative lawsuits, these actions have not, until now,' been
frequently used in Australia.9 Although tort reform in Australia, ° as
5. See Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 21 (1996) and James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions
Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497 (1997) (saying that the securities fraud class action
"captures the spirit of capitalism that is America."). Id at 497. See also Stephen
Choi & Robert Thompson, Symposium: Litigation Reform Since the PSLRA: A Ten-
Year Retrospective: Panel One. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Securities
Litigation and its Lawyers: Changes During the first Decade after the PSLRA, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1489 (2006) (discussing the empirical evidence of the use of such
class actions at 1497-98).
6. See Cox, supra note 5, at 499.
7. This is merely another in the progression of legislation and interpretive cases
to indicate that the higher pleading requirements are effective. See Owen Pell &
Kamari Nelson, Supreme Court Raises Bar for Pleading Securities Fraud Claims,
26(8) BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 12 (2007); Kevin O'Riorden, Clear
Support or Cause for Suspicion? A Critique of Collective Scienter in Securities
Litigation, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1596 (2007).
8. For consideration of the upside for Australian class actions, see Stuart Clark,
Thinking Locally, Suing Globally The International Frontiers of Mass Tort
Litigation in Australia, 74 DEF. COUNS. J 139 (2007).
9. For background on Australian Class Actions, see Vince Morabito, An
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in the United States,11 has had an impact upon the possible use of the
class action, reducing both its attractiveness and usefulness for such
things as consumer litigation, the judicial developments in corporate
law may now mean that class actions in relation to corporate
securities are certain to be the new growth area in Australian
litigation.
This article briefly reviews the class action procedures in both the
United States and Australia. It considers the abuses which have led
to legislation in the United States addressing the misuse of class
actions particularly in relation to corporate securities which underpin
the Tellabs decision. The article then considers the three recent
judicial decisions (Concept Sports, Sons of Gwalia, and Fostit) which
will encourage shareholder litigation (including class actions) in
Australia in future years.
II. Shareholder Litigation: The Procedural Difficulties
Before considering the ability of shareholders to seek redress for
harms done to them individually, it is important to consider the likely
difficulties of such litigation. For injuries in relation to fraud or other
misleading conduct which has resulted in the issuance, purchase or
retention of shares, the individual plaintiff shareholder, acting alone,
would be pursuing claims against a corporate entity which, if still
solvent, is likely to face similar claims from other shareholders once
the plaintiff shareholder proves successful. The disparity between the
two parties (one being potentially liable to numerous parties for the
same action, the other seeking redress for themselves alone) presents
a perfect argument for the use of class actions, a procedure by which a
number of damage claims can be aggregated procedurally. Outside of
the United States, class actions are a relatively novel concept, with
most common law countries following the United Kingdom
representative action model. In such representative action, a plaintiff
may act as the representative of a group of plaintiffs so long as they
Australian Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 69 MOD. L. REV. 347 (2006);
DAMIAN GRAVE & KEN ADAMS, CLASS ACTIONS IN AUSTRALIA (2005).
10. See Barbara McDonald, Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence:
The Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia, 27
SYDNEY L. REV. 443 (2005); See Clark, supra note 8, at 148-150.
11. See Robert Kagan, How Much Do Conservative Tort Tales Matter?, 31 L. &
S. INQ. 711 (2006); John C. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The
Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY L. J. 1225 (2004).
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share a common interest and a common grievance, and the relief
sought is in its nature beneficial to all who are represented.12 Due to
the way these actions developed in the common law outside of the
United States, discussed below, they are better designed for
declaratory relief than damage actions, for the factors which lead to
the attribution and assessment of damages may differ markedly from
plaintiff to plaintiff.
In the event that the defendant company is insolvent, plaintiff
shareholders face the prospect of pursuing claims in insolvency or
bankruptcy in competition with the claims of creditors. In such a case
the success of the claim is likely to be greatly reduced (or eliminated
entirely) depending upon whether the shareholder is considered a
creditor claimant, entitling them to participate equally with all
creditors, or a claimant deferred to the claims of general creditors
because they are deemed to be properly dealt with as equity
contributors whose equity is required to absorb the losses of the firm
so that creditors may be paid. With claims arising from deceitful or
misleading share transactions, the policy argument on the proper
treatment of such claims varies from country to country.13
III. Class Actions and Their Control - The United States
Experience
A. The Historic Evolution
The antecedents of the class action that evolved in the United
States can be found in the English common law, which was faced with
the difficulty of determining the rights of a multitude of parties, some
of whom were unable to be joined in the action. 4 Since it is a
principle of common law justice that those who are not parties to a
12. Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1, 8.
13. To understand the differences between positions of the United States,
Canada, and Australia, see Australian Government Corporations and Markets
Advisory Committee, Discussion Paper. Shareholder Claims Against the Insolvent
Companies: The Implications of the Sons of Gwalia Decision (Sept., 2007). See also
Anil Hargovan & Jason Harris, Sons of Gwalia and statutory debt subordination: An
appraisal of the North Amerfican experience, 20 AUSTL. J. CoRp. L. 265 (2007).
14. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement
Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 687, 687-699 (1997) and Geoffrey
Hazard, John Gedid & Stephen Sowle, An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect
of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1849 (1998) (describing the historical development
of group actions).
[Vol. 31:2
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legal action should not be bound by any purported determination of
their rights; therefore, certain matters would not be possible to
resolve in the absence of particular parties to the dispute.
The English Courts of Chancery evolved methods for dealing
with such contingencies in the seventeenth and eighteenth century.
The Bill of Peace was used in order to resolve disputes with a group
presenting common issues, such as property disputes." Other
examples of actions with a multitude of potential litigants that were
permitted by the Courts of Chancery included creditor claims against
a debtor's estate, legatees' claims against a testamentary estate, and
disputes concerning unincorporated associations. These actions,
involving representatives of those with common rights or burdens,
enabled the resolution of the common issues presented without the
necessary participation of all parties. While initially absent parties
were not bound by such decisions, eventually a number of decisions
affirmed that absent parties could be bound by a determination so as
to avoid a multiplicity of litigation. These procedures originally
developed unsystematically. However, when the common law and
equity courts were merged in England in 1873, the new rules of
procedure attached as a schedule to the Supreme Court of Judicature
Act 1873 (Eng.), 6 and adopted the chancery practice (addressed in
greater detail in the section dealing with Australian class actions,
below). Lord Macnaghten, in Duke of Bedford v. Ellis,7 summarized
the policy objectives of the rule in the following terms:
The old rule in the Court of Chancery was very simple and
perfectly well understood. Under the old practice the Court
required the presence of all parties interested in the matter in suit,
in order that a final end might be made of the controversy. But
when the parties were so numerous that you never could 'come at
justice,' to use an expression in one of the older cases, if everybody
interested was made a party, the rule was not allowed to stand in
the way. It was originally a rule of convenience; for the sake of
convenience it was relaxed."
Similar issues as those faced in the English Courts were also
being addressed in the United States, and the practice of the English
15. Zechariah Chafee, Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1297 (1932).
16. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vic., c. 66. (Eng.).
17. Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1.
18. Id. at 8.
2008]
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Chancery Court found resonance with Justice Joseph Story in his
authoritative text on pleadings in equity. 9 In this treatise, Justice
Story indicated that all persons materially interested in the subject
matter of a suit should be joined as parties. He further indicated,
however, that where the parties were so numerous as to make it
impractical to join all the parties, joinder could be dispensed with if it
could be done without injury to the persons not actually before the
court. The evolution of multi-party litigation in the United States
Federal Equity Courts proceeded in somewhat contradictory ways
through the development of the common law (e.g., Smith v.
Swormsted ° and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Caubld) and
through the promulgation of procedural rules, which allowed for such
actions.
The principles applying to class actions in the United States did
not achieve precise clarification despite the work of commentators in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.23 As in England,
the procedures which developed in the Courts of Equity to deal with
class actions were normally allowed for Courts which were newly able
to exercise both law and equity jurisdiction. The procedures adopted
in 1938 for the United States federal courts upon this event were
largely based upon the work of Justice Story.24 Reflective of the
19. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS (1838).
20. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288 (1853).
21. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
22. These contradictory developments are discussed in Hazard, Gedid & Sowle,
supra note 14, at 1897-1902. While Swormstedt and Ben-Hur indicated that the
decree in the case would be binding upon all in the class represented including those
who were absent (Swormstedt, 57 U.S. at 302), Rule 48 of the Federal Equity Rules
of 1842 stated:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and can not, without
manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought
before it, the Court in its discretion may dispense with making all of them
parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before it to
represent all the adverse interest of the plaintiffs and defendants in the suit
properly before it. But, in such cases, the decree shall be without prejudice
to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
Hazard, Gedid, & Sowle, supra note 14, at 232.
23. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1881);
THOMAS A. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE (1909). A discussion of their
attempts at synthesis of class action jurisprudence can be found in Hazard, Gedid &
Sowle, supra note 14, at 1917-1923.
24. By the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Congress authorized the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of procedure for the district courts. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat.
1064 (1934). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1938) abolished the distinction
between law and equity. 308 U.S. 645, 663 (1939) (repealed 1966). See Alexander
[Vol. 31:2
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classification developed by Justice Story, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Federal Rules") adopted in 1938 provided for three
categories of class actions:'
(1) true class actions, which were suits involving joint rights;
(2) hybrid class actions, which were suits involving rights in a
specific property involving a strong identity of interests among the
class members; and
(3) spurious class actions, which necessitated only that the class
shared a common question of law or fact."
The first two types of actions were relatively limited in their
application. The third type of class action (the spurious class action)
was not binding on absent members of the class, and was
consequently somewhat unattractive.27 As a result, class actions,
though permitted in the United States for the sake of convenience in
multi-party litigation, were not frequently used prior to the
amendment of the class action rules in 1966.28 At that time, the
Federal Rules were amended to modernize the procedures applicable
to class actions in the United States federal courts (with numerous of
the States eventually adopting similar procedures).
Class actions are now governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules.
The prerequisites to bringing a class action are enumerated in Rule
23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and Remedies Under the New Federal
Procedure, 31 CAL. L. REV. 127 (1943); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity
and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
25. Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 14, at 1938-1940 (citing James W. Moore
& Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 308-311 (1937)).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23,308 U.S. 689 (1938) (repealed 1966).
27. Hazard, Gedid & Sowle, supra note 14, at 407 (citing James W. Moore &
Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions - Jurisdiction and Effect, 32 ILL. L. REV. 555,
561-62 (1938)).
28. The various arguments about the consequences of these changes are
considered in Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:
Myth, Reality and the "Class Action Problem, "92 HARv. L. REV. 664 (1979). See
also, Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committe." 1966Amendments
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 375-401 (1967).
2008]
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(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
The procedure applicable to actions which meet the prerequisites
above depend partially upon their characterization into one of three
types of action:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish
incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(b) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the
interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
29
controversy.
Significantly, the third classification introduced in 1966
contemplated its use for litigation involving damages. It is this
significant change in emphasis which led both to increased popularity
of class actions subsequent to 1966 and efforts, both domestically and
internationally, to reassess its utility.' In ascertaining whether the
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
30. See, Arthur Miller, supra note 28, at 665-674; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
[Vol. 31:2
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matter fits within a type three (3) class action, the two critical issues
are:
(1) whether common questions of law and fact predominate;
and
(2) whether a class action is the superior procedure to use.
In making these determinations, the following matters are
specifically enumerated as relevant:
(1) the interest of members of the class in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(2) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already commenced by or against members of
the class;
(3) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
Once a class action is brought pursuant to the procedures
outlined above, the Court is required to determine - at an early
practicable time - whether to certify the action as a class action.3 1 If
the action is certified as a class action, the class must be defined along
with the class claims, issues or defenses.33 Further, a class counsel
must be appointed pursuant to the procedures provided in the rules?'
One important feature of class actions in the United States is the
Understanding the Plaintiffs' Attorney The Implications of Economic Theory for
Pfivate Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669 (1986); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions.- Efficiency, Compensation,
Deterrence, & Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEG. STUD. 47 (1975).
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g) indicates that an attorney appointed to serve as class
counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. In appointing
class counsel, the court must consider: the work counsel has done in identifying or
investigating potential claims in the action; counsel's experience in handling class
actions, other complex litigation, and claims of the type asserted in the action,
counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and the resources counsel will commit to
representing the class. The Court may consider any other matter pertinent to
counsel's ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class and may
direct potential class counsel to provide information on any subject pertinent to the
appointment and to propose terms for attorney fees and non-taxable costs.
20081
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provision for class members to "opt out" and to seek their own
individual redress. For class actions of the kind certified under Rule
23(b)(3), class members must be provided by the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, of the following information":
(1) the nature of the action,
(2) the definition of the class certified,
(3) the class claims, issues, or defenses,
(4) that a class member may enter an appearance through
counsel if the member so desire,
(5) that the court will exclude from the class any member
who requests exclusion, stating when and how members
may elect to be excluded, and
(6) the binding effect of a class judgment on class members.
The class action procedure further allows for the class action to
proceed in relation to particular issues, or the action may be divided
into subclasses. A judgment in such a class action, whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to
whom the notice was provided and who did not request exclusion,
and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
In order to inhibit the misuse of class actions, procedures provide
for continuing judicial supervision of the action and involvement of
class members in any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise.
The court:
(1) must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a
certified class;
(2) must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class
members who would be bound by a proposed
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise; and
(3) may approve a settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise that would bind class members only after a
hearing and on finding that the settlement, voluntary
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). This may include individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
[Vol. 31:2
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dismissal, or compromise is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.
The parties proposing the settlement, dismissal, or compromise
must file a statement identifying any agreement made in connection
with the proposal, and any class member may object to a proposed
settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise.'
B. Class Actions for Securities Claims
The use of class actions to compensate numerous plaintiffs for
failures relating to securities regulation was one of the consequences
of the United States class action regime. While this may have had
positive effects in deterring culpable activity, assuring that numerous
small claimants would not be injured without remedy, and efficiently
dealing with a multitude of claims, misuse of the system also
developed.
Prior to 1995, securities class actions in the United States were
subject to a number of abuses attributable to elements both of the
class action itself and to litigation practices in the United States
procedural system, such as the existence of contingency fees and the
lack of any method for requiring reimbursement of costs from
unsuccessful litigants.37 Because defendant corporations bore the
major share of the costs relating to the litigation (particularly the
discovery costs), they were faced with the inevitability of incurring
great costs relating to the litigation with no possible offsetting benefit.
Further, such discovery could possibly reveal information which was
not within the contemplation of the plaintiffs at the time of the
original action. From the corporation's perspective, there was no
possible upside - a successful defense leaving the corporation out of
pocket for the costs of litigation, as well as the disturbance which such
litigation caused to the internal functioning of the business.
The abuses that developed as a result of the class action system
in the United States relating to securities have been frequently
36. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). This has proved to be a problem elsewhere as well. See
Vince Morabito, Judicial Supervision of Individual Settlements with Class Members
in Australia, Canada and the United States, 38 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 663 (2003).
37. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877(1987);
Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class
Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000); William J.
Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiff's Bar: Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-
Action Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1994).
2008]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
discussed in academic literature, and are often referred to as "strike
suits."" Lawyers representing the first plaintiffs in a class action
would be in a preferred position to control the litigation and to reap
any benefits from a contingency fee upon recovery or settlement. 9
As a consequence, potential plaintiffs, often with nominal share
investment, would liaise with lawyers who were accustomed to
managing such class actions so as to enable a quick filing of a suit
when events (such as a drop in the share price of a corporation)
indicated that the corporation had failed to disclose all material
particulars to its shareholders or the market. Most actions were
commenced within ten days of such events.
40
Due to the disincentives that the defendant corporations faced
when opposing the class action claims, settlement of the action was
often preferable to continued litigation, which would involve great
expense and possible further litigation exposure. On the other side,
plaintiff lawyers were faced with the decision of a quick settlement
and an immediate collection of fees (set without reference to the
length of the action or the total effort undertaken), or a prolonged
litigation with significant time and cost for the plaintiffs as well as the
defendant corporation.4' Not surprisingly, many of these actions were
settled prior even to the completion of discovery based on a cost
benefit analysis undertaken by the defendant corporation and the
lawyers representing the plaintiffs. 42  The plaintiffs received their
compensation only after payment of lawyers' fees. For those plaintiffs
who remained shareholders in the defendant corporation, their
investment in the corporation itself suffered as a result of the
38. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions
Virtuous, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 497 (1997).
39. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000).
40. See B. Scott Daugherty, Uncharted Waters.- Securities Class Actions in Texas
after the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J.
143, 161 n.83 (1999), (citing JAMES HAMILTON, FED. SEc. L. REP., PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACr OF 1995 144 (1996).
41. These excesses are described in Tiffany Wong, Defendants' Standing to
Oppose Lead Plaintiff Appointment Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 833, 834-837 (2003). See also Charles Silver,
"We're Scared to Death " Class Certification & Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357
(2003).
42. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements
in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
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necessary payment." Although such private action could be seen to
encourage appropriate behavior by corporate management, many
began to question whether, in light of the potential abuses, this was
the most efficient way to assure appropriate action by corporate
management.4
Addressing the growing complaints about the misuse of "strike
suits" relating to securities, 5 Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act in 1995. 46 This Act attempted to end the use of
abusive "strike suits" by:
(1) imposing higher standards in relation to the pleadings
for private securities claims to deter the filing of
baseless claims and encourage plaintiffs to undertake a
proper investigation before filing suit;
4
1
(2) preventing plaintiffs from abusing the discovery process
in order to induce settlements;48
(3) providing Court control over the determination of the
lead plaintiff;49 and
43. Tim Brandi, The Strike Suit- A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and
the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355 (1993).
44. William S. Larach, Achieving Corporate Governance Enhancements through
Litigation, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1 (2001); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003).
45. Julia C. Kou, Closing the Loophole in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 253, 254 (1998); Richard M. Phillips &
Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19951" Rebalancing
Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers,
51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1013 (1996).
46. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995).
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2) (2000). See also O'Riorden, supra note 41, at
1606-7.
48. See id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). See also Hillary Sale, Heightened Pleading and
Discovery Stays: An Analysis of The Effect of the PSLRA's Internal-Information
Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 537 (1998).
49. See id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A). This also provides limitations on the number of
times a plaintiff may be lead plaintiff within a three year period, thereby inhibiting
professional litigants. See Stephen Choi & Robert Thompson, supra note 5; James
Cox & Randall Thomas, Symposium: Litigation Reform Since the PSLRA: A Ten-
Year Retrospective: Panel One: Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Does the
Plaintiff Matter An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (2006).
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(4) enhancing the penalties for actions brought for an
improper purpose.' °
One significant check against abusive litigation in private
securities fraud actions accomplished by the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was the inclusion of exacting pleading
requirements. The Act required plaintiffs to state with particularity
both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts
evidencing scienter (defendant's intention "to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.")51 Plaintiffs must now "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind."52
Because Congress left the key term "strong inference" in the
pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act undefined, the full implications of the pleading requirements
remained somewhat uncertain and Federal Courts of Appeal had
divided on its meaning.53 In Tellabs v. Mako,54 the United States
Supreme Court clarified that the standard was high indeed:
In the case before us, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that the "strong inference" standard would be met if the
complaint "allege[d] facts from which, if true, a reasonable person
could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent." 437
F.3d 588, 602 (2006). That formulation, we conclude, does not
capture the stricter demand Congress sought to convey in §
21D(b)(2). It does not suffice that a reasonable factfinder plausibly
could infer from the complaint's allegations the requisite state of
mind. Rather, to determine whether a complaint's scienter
allegations can survive threshold inspection for sufficiency, a court
governed by § 21D(b)(2) must engage in a comparative evaluation;
it must consider, not only inferences urged by the plaintiff, as the
Seventh Circuit did, but also competing inferences rationally drawn
from the facts alleged. An inference of fraudulent intent may be
plausible, yet less cogent than other, nonculpable explanations for
the defendant's conduct. To qualify as "strong" within the
intendment of § 21D(b)(2), we hold, an inference of scienter must
be more than merely plausible or reasonable - it must be cogent
50. See id. at § 78u-4(c). See also, FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
51. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,193 n.12,194 (1976).
52. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
53. See Charles A. Wright & Arthur M. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1301.1, at 300-302 (3d ed. 2004).
54. Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
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and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of
nonfraudulent intent."
The changes made by the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 were intended to effect a rebalancing of the litigation
process in relation to securities. However, the effectiveness of the
changes, including the increased pleading standards, remain
uncertain. 6 Consequently, concerns with the impact of class actions
generally continued even after the passage of that legislation. 7 In
particular, class actions under the laws of various states did not
replicate the limitations imposed upon class actions in the federal
courts. In consequence of these limitations, state jurisdiction over
class actions (primarily tort related class actions) continued to be
attractive to potential litigants. Congress was concerned that
plaintiffs were choosing amenable States for the determination of
lawsuits of national scope and interest.
The first attempt to prevent misuse of state based class actions
for securities suits occurred in 1998 with the passage of the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act. 8 This Act attempts to pre-empt
state securities law in favor of federal regulation. This is
accomplished by:
(1) providing exclusive federal jurisdiction for actions in
which the plaintiff alleges either an untrue statement or
omission in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the
American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, or any other
national exchange with similar listing rules;59 and
(2) providing exclusive federal jurisdiction for actions in
which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant used a
55. Id at 2504-05.
56. Stephen Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV.
1465 (2004); James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market
Empirical Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996) See
also Choi & Thompson, supra note 5.
57. See Stephen Choi, Do Merits Matter Less after the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007); Damian Moos, Pleading
Around the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.: Reevaluating the Pleading
Requirements for Market Manipulation Claims, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 763 (2005).
58. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act , Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (1998).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000).
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manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the
purchase or sale of such securities. 6°
In Merrill Lynch v. Dabit,61 the United States Suprenme Court
bolstered the effect of this legislation by determining that "holders"
(those neither buying nor selling but induced to hold as a result of the
culpable action) are also covered.
The concern about flight from federal class action controls was
further addressed by The Class Action Fairness Act, passed in 2005.62
This Act did not attempt to modify the applicable Federal class action
procedures,63 but rather made the use of State class actions more
difficult by expanding federal diversity jurisdiction over interstate
class actions and by broadening the powers to remove an action to the
federal court and limiting the ability to have the action remanded.
Additionally, the Act permits class actions to be brought in, or
removed to Federal Court if:
(1) at least $5 million is in controversy (excluding interest
and costs); and
(2) at least one plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of
different states or of a state and a foreign country.64
Despite the general limitation of class actions affected by the
Class Action Fairness Act, securities litigation was specifically
"carved out" from its operation.65 Nevertheless, the Class Action
Fairness Act provides further evidence that control of class action
litigation is continuing in the United States.66
It is clear that class actions in the United States have been a very
useful device for litigating issues involving a multitude of claims,
including claims which would result in the award of damages. The
excesses which class actions may be perceived to have instigated have
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2000).
61. Merrill Lynch v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
62. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2000).
65. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9)(A)
(2005), indicates that diversity jurisdiction allowed for in section 1332(d)(2)) does not
apply to class actions involving claims which only concern securities, and § 5(a), 28
U.S.C. § 1453(d)(1), exempts such class actions from removal to federal district court.
66. See Jeffery T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private
RightsofAction Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 621 (2006).
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been addressed both in relation to securities class actions and in
relation to class actions generally.67 The Tellabs case confirms just
how high the standards for pleading in securities fraud cases has now
become, with the result that misuse of securities class actions in the
United States is now, hopefully, a thing of the past. While this may
prove to be so, the history of the excesses of class actions in the
United States continues to plague the ready acceptance of class
actions in the rest of the common law world. Nevertheless, Australia
in particular has shown a willingness to embrace class actions. The
Australian judicial developments which occurred in 2005-2007
(discussed below) will undoubtedly see increased litigation. That
such litigation may tend toward abuse is not, fortunately, as likely in
consequence of certain differences between United States and
Australian law and legal culture.
IV. Australian Class Action Procedures
Aside from the adoption of class actions in Canada,' Australia,
and its States of Victoria69 and South Australia' have thus far proved
to be the common law jurisdictions outside North America which
have been most receptive to class the United States model of actions.
67. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: the Forthcoming, Near- Total Demise
of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 422-425 (2005).
68. Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec, 1994, R.S.Q., ch. C-25 , operating from
January 1979; Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O., ch. 6 (Ont.), from January 1993;
Class Proceedings Act, 1996, R.S.B.C., ch. 50 (B.C.), from August 1995; Class
Actions Act, 2001, R.S.S., ch. C-12.01 (Sask.), from January 2002; Class Actions Act,
2001, R.S.N., ch. C-18.1 (Nfld.), from April 2002; Class Proceedings Act, 2002, S.M.,
ch. 14 (Man.), from January 2003; Federal Court Rules,1998, S.O.R./98-106, R.
299.1-299.42 (Can.), from November 2002; and Class Proceedings Act, 2003, S.A. ch.
C-16.5 (Alta.), from April, 2004. See Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian
Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 269 (2001).
69. Supreme Court Act, 1986, Part 4A (Vict.), available at
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/aullegis/vic/consolact/sca1986183/> (visited Feb. 2, 2008)
This legislation was passed after an evaluation prepared in August 1995, for the
Victorian Attorney-General's Law Reform Advisory Council. See V. MORABITO &
J. EPSTEIN, CLASS ACTIONS IN VICTORIA - TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH (1997). After
legislative inaction, the Supreme Court of Victoria added a new Order 18A to the
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules, 1996 (Vict.). This new order was
challenged as beyond the judicial power of the Supreme Court, but the challenge was
rejected in Schutt Flying Academy (Austl) Pty. Ltd. v. Mobil Oil Austl. Ltd. (2000) 1
V.R. 545. Before that determination could be appealed to the High Court of
Australia, the Victorian Parliament enacted the abovementioned legislative
framework for class actions similar to the regime under Order 18A.
70. Supreme Court Rules, 1987, Rule 34 (South Austl.), from January 1987.
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The procedures for dealing with multiple parties to an action in
Australia until recent times generally duplicated those found in the
United Kingdom. 1 In tracing the history of the representative action
in Australia in Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd.,2 the High
Court of Australia commenced its discussion with a summary of the
iconic representative action case, Duke of Bedford v Ellis.73
Considering whether it was appropriate for a number of plaintiffs to
sue on behalf of themselves and all other growers of fruit, flowers,
vegetables, roots and herbs in Covent Garden, Lord Macnaghten,
with whom the majority in the case concurred, identified the three
criteria which must be satisfied before the representative rule could
apply:
Given a common interest and a common grievance, a
representative suit was in order if the relief sought was in its nature
beneficial to all whom the plaintiff proposed to represent.
7 4
In the view of the Court, there was a common interest among
these growers, and it was irrelevant that the group consisted of
membership that fluctuated and was thus difficult to identify and
catalogue at any particular time. Further, even though the plaintiffs
were claiming separate and different rights, this did not prevent them
from using the representative procedure.
While the criteria mentioned by Lord Macnaghten would have
provided ample opportunity for representative actions in the United
Kingdom (and Australia) to develop, the English Court of Appeal, in
the case of Markt & Co. Ltd. v Knight Steamship Co. Ltd" limited
the scope of the concept of "common interest" significantly. In that
case, shippers sought damages for the loss of goods on a ship that was
sunk during the Russo-Japanese war. A majority of the Court of
Appeal determined that the shippers did not have a common interest
because each contract of carriage was different from others, with
potentially different defenses. As a result of this case, it was accepted
71. See RACHEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL
SYSTEMS (2004); Vince Morabito, Federal Class Actions, Contingency Fees, and the
Rules Governing Litigation Costs, 21 MON. U. L. REV. 231 (1995). The procedures
of the various Australian States is addressed in Grave & Adams, supra note 9, at
appendix 8.
72. Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd.(1995) 182 C.L.R. 398.
73. Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [19011 A.C. 1. The High Court's discussion is found
at Carnie v. Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398, 416.
74. Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1, 8.
75. Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd (1910) 2 K.B. 1021 (C.A.).
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that the representative action should exclude those cases where
several damages were claimed and where individual contracts were
involved.76
Although the cases of Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman
Industries Ltd." and Irish Shipping Ltd. v. Commercial Assurance Co.
Pl78 addressed the issue of the "same interest" required for a
representative action and seemed to relax this requirement to some
extent, there was not general acceptance that a representative action
could be brought where the relief sought was several damages. 7 This
particular constraint on the usefulness of the representative action,
which distinguishes that action from the United States style class
action, has been subject to academic criticism' but has continued in
the United Kingdom.
Due to the perceived deficiencies of the representative action,
the Law Reform Commission of Australia recommended in 1988 that
changes to the group proceedings for the Australian Federal Court be
allowed so as to enable actions similar to the United States class
action. As a result of this recommendation, Part IVA of the Federal
Court Act was introduced."1 The general objectives of Part IVA were
identified in the second reading speech for the Federal Court of
Australia Amendment Bill, 1991, (Austl.):
The Bill gives the Federal Court an efficient and effective
procedure to deal with multiple claims. Such a procedure is needed
for two purposes. The first is to provide a real remedy where,
although many people are affected and the total amount at issue is
significant, each person's loss is small and not economically viable
to recover in individual actions. It will thus give access to the courts
to those in the community who have been effectively denied justice
76. Id. at 1040-41.
77. Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd (1981) Ch. 229 (per
Vinelott J.).
78. Irish Shipping Ltd. v. Commercial Assurance Co. Plc (1991) 2 Q.B. 206
(C.A.).
79. See Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v. Times
Newspapers Ltd., (1980) Q.B. 585, 601. As an example of the difficulties this has
caused in the context of land contamination, see Ethan James, An American
Warewolf in London: Applying the Lessons of Superfund to Great Britain, 19 YALE
J. INT'L. L. 349 (1994).
80. Rachel Mulheron, From Representative Action to Class Action: Steps rather
than Leaps, 24 Civ. Jus. Q. 424 (2005).
81. Part IVA was inserted into the Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, (Austl.)
in 1991 by the Federal Court of Australia Amendment Act, 1991, (Austl.), which
commenced on 4 March 1992.
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because of the high cost of taking action.
The second purpose of the Bill is to deal efficiently with the
situation where the damages sought by each claimant are large
enough to justify individual actions and a large number of persons
wish to sue the respondent. The new procedure will mean that
groups of persons, whether they be shareholders or investors, or
people pursuing consumer claims, will be able to obtain redress and
do so more cheaply and efficiently than would be the case with
individual actions.
An action can be brought under the expanded Part VIA.
[W]here:
(1) 7 or more persons have claims against the same person;
(2) the claims of all those persons are in respect of, or arise
out of, the same, similar or related circumstances; and
(3) the claims of all those persons give rise to a substantial
common issue of law or fact;
a proceeding may be commenced by one or more of those persons as
representing some or all of them.83
The person who brings the action must have, in order to bring
the representative action, a sufficient interest to commence a
proceeding on his or her own behalf.' Group members must be
notified of the commencement of the proceeding and they must also
be notified of their right to opt out of the proceedings. 5 Generally, a
person's consent to be a group member in a representative
proceeding is not required.86 Nevertheless, a group member may "opt
82. Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, Nov. 14 1991,
3174-3175. This is statement of purpose is referred to by the High Court in Wong v.
Silkfield Pty. Ltd. (1999) 199 C.L.R. 255, 264; 165 A.L.R. 373, 379; Carnie v. Esanda
Fin. Corp. Ltd. (1995) 182 C.L.R. 398.
83. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, pt. IVA, § 33C (Austl.).
84. Id. at § 33D.
85. Id. at § 33X. The method of notification is dealt with in § 33Y. In
subsections (5) and (8), this section provides:
(5) The Court may not order that notice be given personally to each group
member unless it is satisfied that it is reasonably practicable, and not unduly
expensive, to do so.
(8) The failure of a group member to receive or respond to a notice does not
affect a step taken, an order made, or a judgment given, in a proceeding.
The date by which the opt out must occur is to be fixed by the Court
according to § 33J (1).
86. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, pt. IVA, § 33E(1),(2) (Austi.).
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out" of the representative proceeding by written notice given prior to
a date fixed by the Court.'
Once an action commences, the Court has significant latitude in
its control of the proceedings. It may order that a representative
proceeding no longer continue where it is satisfied that it is in the
interests of justice to do so."' If the determination of the issue or
issues common to all group members will not finally determine the
claims of all group members, the Court may give directions
concerning the determination of the remaining issues.89 The Court
may substitute another group member as a representative party and
may make such other orders as it thinks fit if a representative party is
not able to represent adequately the interest of the group members.9°
Finally, the Court has broad powers in relation to the dispute. It
can do any one or more of the following things:
(1) determine an issue of law;
(2) determine an issue of fact;
(3) make a declaration of liability;
(4) grant any equitable relief;
(5) make an award of damages for group members, being
damages consisting of specified amounts or amounts
worked out in such manner as the Court specifies;
(6) award damages in an aggregate amount without
specifying amounts awarded in respect of individual
group members;
(7) make such other order as the Court thinks just.91
However, the Court generally must not make an award of
damages in an aggregate amount. Rather it must specify amounts
awarded in relation to each group member.92
Although the class action procedure in Australia would appear
to provide great scope for use in securities litigation, until recently it
87. Federal Court Rules, 1979, § 33J (Austl.).
88. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, pt. IVA, § 33N (Austl.) provides
particular reasons why a Court may reach that conclusion.
89. Id. at § 33Q(1).
90. Id. at § 33T.
91. Id. at § 33Z(1).
92. Id at § 33Z(3).
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has primarily been used for tort litigation. Due to failures in the
insurance industry in the late 1990s, however, the Federal
government responded to calls for tort reform so as to limit claims
and tighten the use of class actions for tort litigation.93  In
consequence of these changes, Australian litigation specialists have
turned their energies to trade practices and securities litigation, fields
of endeavor which, unlike the United States, have largely remained
unexplored in Australia. "
V. Developments Improving Shareholder Claims in
Australia
One interesting aspect of many colonial settlements is the
tendency of the colonists to attempt to retain the customs, traditions
and norms of their home culture. Because the home culture is likely
to continue to evolve, colonists who cling too closely to the home
culture known to them at the time of separation may find that they
continue with traditions and customs despite the fact that they have
been abandoned or modified in the home country. The colonial
deference to the English common law found throughout much of the
common law world has, since the events circa 1776, never caused
significant problems in the United States. The same, unfortunately,
cannot be said of Australia. The legal rights of shareholders in the
broader context of company law present a case in point."
Shareholders in Australia have faced certain impediments in
their efforts to seek redress after having been misled into investment.
First, they were required to rescind their contract of purchase before
suing the company in which they had invested under the case of
Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank.96 If able to pursue a claim,
shareholders' claims were normally paid only after other creditors,
irrespective of the fact that the claims related to deceitful action by
the company.' Finally, Australian law, like that of the United
Kingdom, does not normally allow for contingency fees for lawyers.
93. See McDonald, supra note 10, at 443; See Clark, supra note 8, at 139.
94. Brendan Sweeney, The Role of Damages in Regulating Horizontal Price
Fixing: Comparing the Situation in the United States, Europe and Australia, 30
MELB. U. L. REV. 837 (2006).
95. For an interesting discussion of the development of company law in
Australia, see Phillip Lipton, A History of Company Law in Colonial Australia:
LegalEvolution and Economic Development, 31 MELB. U. L. REV. (2007).
96. Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, [1880] 5 App. Cas. 317 (H.L.)(U.K.).
97. Corporations Act, 2001, § 563A (Austl.).
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Three recent cases from Australia, Concept Sports, Sons of
Gwalia, and Fostifhave each modified the long-standing impediments
to shareholder actions. As a consequence, Australian shareholders
are now in a much better position than their Unites States
counterparts to pursue remedies for securities fraud.
A. Abandonment of Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank by
A ustralia
i. Houldsworth as applied in Australia
For numerous years, the English case of Houldsworth v. City of
GlasgowBankl8 ("Houldsworth") prevented much securities litigation
in Australia. In that case, decided in 1880, the House of Lords
determined that the corporate law of both England and Scotland did
not permit an action for misrepresentation or deceit by a subscribing
shareholder against the company in which the shares were issued
unless that shareholder first rescinded the subscription contract.
The decision in Houldsworth was based upon two principles.
First, the court found the allowance of a claim for damages by a
member against his company to be inconsistent with the implied term
of the statutory contract between a member, his company, and all the
other members which the constituent documents (known in Australia
since the late 1990s as the Constitution, and generally known in the
United States as the Articles and Bylaws) represent. This contract
now finds its statutory basis in Section 140 of the Corporations Act,
2001, (Austl). That statute, among other things, indicates that the
capital which the member has subscribed should be applied only in
payment of the debts and liabilities of the company." Indicating that
to allow a shareholder to seek damages for any misrepresentation or
deceit when becoming a shareholder would be inconsistent with their
obligations as a shareholder both to the company and to other
shareholders, Earl Cairns, Lord Chancellor, stated:
But he has contracted, and his contract remains, that these assets
and contributions shall be applied in payment of the debts and
liabilities of the company, among which, as I have said, this [claim]
could not be reckoned. The result is, he is making a claim which is
inconsistent with the contract into which he has entered, and by
98. Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, [1880] 5 App. Cas. 317 (H.L.)(U.K.).
99. Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, [1880] 5 App. Cas. 317, 325
(H.L.)(U.K.); In Re Addlestone Linoleum Co., (1887) 37 Ch. D. 191,205-206 (U.K.).
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which he wishes to abide; in other words, he is in substance if not in
form taking the course which is described as approbating and
reprobating, a course which is not allowed either in Scotch or
English Law."°
Further, the decision in Houldsworth was justified by the notion
that shareholders' capital was committed, in the event of liquidation,
until creditors had been fully paid. Consequently, to allow a claim for
damages against a company by a subscribing shareholder without
rescission of the subscription contract would be tantamount to
reversing the general concept of subordination of shareholders'
claims for return of capital to the claims of creditors. In the 1998
United Kingdom case of Soden v. British Commonwealth Holdings
Pc4'' Lord Brown-Wilkinson restated this principle in the following
terms:
The relevant principle is that the rights of members as member
come last, i.e. rights founded on the statutory contract are, as
the price of limited liability, subordinated to the rights of
creditors based on other legal causes of action. The rationale
of the section is to ensure that the rights of members as such
do not compete with the rights of the general body of
creditors.""
Adding further difficulty to any shareholder seeking redress
against the company was the principle that once winding up of a
company commenced (bankruptcy, in United States terminology),
rescission of the subscription contract was no longer permissible.' °3
Where rescission was not possible or where affirmation of the
contract had occurred, an action in deceit provided an alternative.
According to House of Lords decision in Derry v Peek" one of the
primary elements of such an action was the knowledge of the person
making the representation that it was untrue. This required that (1)
the defendant knew or believed the statement in question to be
false; 5 or (2) he did not believe it to be true; or (3) he made it in
100. Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank, [1880] 5 App. Cas. 317, 325
(H.L)(U.K.).
101. Soden v. British Commonwealth Holdings Plc., [1998] A.C. 298 (H.L)(U.K.).
102. Id. at 324.
103. Oakes v. Turquand, [1867] 2 L.R.S. & D. App. 325,351-52.
104. Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.).
105. This required a direct and positive untruth; an omission would not suffice
unless the omission rendered that which was said to be false. See Oakes v. Turquand,
[1867] 2 L.R.S. & D. App. 325; Peek v. Gurney, [1873] 6 L.R.S. & D. App. 377.
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reckless ignorance of whether it was true or false."° In applying these
requirements to companies, there was a difference of opinion as to its
application. One view indicated that a company could not be made
liable for fraud, since that was a quality attributable only to a natural
person,'07 while the opposing point of view was that the fraud of an
agent could make a company vicariously liable.1°8
In order to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the liability of
the company's agents for their role in misleading investors, Section 3
of the Directors Liability Act 1890 (Eng.)," the forerunner of the
Australian prospectus liability provisions, was enacted. Under this
legislation, every director, promoter and other person who authorised
the issue of a prospectus was, subject to certain exceptions, made
liable to pay damages that a subscriber suffered "by reason of any
untrue statement in the prospectus." Although this had the effect of
providing a statutory cause of action without the uncertainties
surrounding an action for deceit, neither it nor the Australian statute
modelled upon it specifically created a cause of action against the
company on whose behalf the prospectus had been issued."
The uncertainty surrounding liability for false statements in a
prospectus has now been resolved in the United Kingdom. The
common law eventually clarified when a company would be
responsible for the misrepresentations or fraudulent acts of the
company's agents. More importantly, however, the rule in
Houldsworth has been statutorily abrogated. Section ll1A of the
Companies Act, 1985, (UK)". now provides:
A person is not debarred from obtaining damages or other
compensation from a company by reason only of his holding or
having held shares in the company or any right to apply or
subscribe for shares or to be included in the company's register in
respect of shares.
In contrast to the position in the United Kingdom, Houldsworth
continued with vitality in Australia, since there has been no
106. Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.).
107. See Abrath v. The Ne. Ry. Co., [1886] 11 App. Cas. 247 , 250-51 (Lord
Bramwell's speech).
108. LINDLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMPANIES 74, 216-19 (5th ed, 1889).
109. Directors Liability Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64 (Eng.).
110. However, legislative changes were made in 1998 which arguably had such an
effect. These are discussed in the commentary concerning Cadence Asset Mgmt. Pty
Ltd. v. Concept Sports Ltd, supra note 4.
111. Inserted by the Companies Act, 1989, (Eng.).
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enactment in Australia similar to the United Kingdom's Section
111A. As a result, Houldsworth, representing as it does longstanding
English precedent of continuing effect in Australia, operated to
prevent shareholders from pursuing claims against corporations in
which they hold shares so long as there is no statutory abrogation of
the Houldsworth rule.
Several times in recent years the Australian judiciary has had to
consider whether statutory enactments have abrogated the rule in
Houldsworth. The most authoritative decision on the matter was the
case of Webb Distributors (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria,"' which
determined an appeal from the Victorian judgment of Victoria v.
Hodgson & Ors."
3
In Webb, the High Court considered whether the Trade
Practices Act, 1974, (Austl.), an innovative consumer-type piece of
legislation intended, among other things, to prevent misleading and
deceptive conduct, could be seen as abrogating the Houldsworth
decision when the misleading and deceptive conduct was in relation
to the subscription for shares. Despite the broad statutory scheme
creating liability for such conduct generally, the High Court refused
to accept the contention that an action by a shareholder could
proceed under the Trade Practices Act in the following
circumstances:
It was the appellant's contention that the Trade Practices Act
provided its "own code of remedies, unfettered."
The Trade Practices Act is unquestionably a piece of innovative
legislation. But it is not to be seen as eliminating, "by a side-wind",
the detailed provisions established for more than a hundred years
to govern the winding up of a company.114
The decision in Webb indicated that specific common law
principles were unlikely to be overturned unless the Australian
Parliament indicated a clear intention that the common law be
overturned. It was unclear what would be sufficient evidence of such
Parliamentary intent.
ii Concept Sports." The Federal Court Questions Houldsworth
In late 2005, the Federal Court of Australia considered the
112. Webb Distributors (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (1993) 179 C.L.R. 15.
113. Victoria v. Hodgson & Ors. (1992) 2 V.R. 613.
114. Webb Distributors (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (1993) 179 C.L.R. 15, 37.
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continuing vitality of Houldsworth in Australia in light of the specific
provisions of the Corporations Act, 2001, (Austl.) which provided for
liability for a defective prospectus in the case of Cadence Asset
Management Pty Ltd (as trustee for Cadence Capital) v Concept
Sports Ltd"5 ( "Cadence").
Concept Sports Ltd sought to raise $12 million by issuing a
prospectus offering 24 million ordinary shares at an issue price of
$0.50 each. The prospectus contained financial information about the
company, including forecast sales revenue and forecast earnings
before interest and tax. The prospectus also contained statements
about Concept Sports' activities, the strength of its business and the
future prospects for that business. In addition, there appears to have
been several implicit representations in the prospectus, to the effect
that all material information had been disclosed and that all
reasonable investigations had been undertaken to ensure that the
information in the prospectus was accurate.
The plaintiff subscribed for shares in Concept Sports allegedly on
the strength of the prospectus; however, the plaintiff asserted that:
(1) the prospectus did not contain all of the information
which by statute it was required it to contain;
(2) the forecasts for sales revenue and earnings and the
statements about the company's outlook were
misleading and deceptive; and
(3) certain implied representations in the prospectus were
false."6
The plaintiff did not rescind the contract of subscription, but
rather sold the shares to a third party at a loss. The plaintiff then
sought to recover the loss (initial price ($0.50) less the average sale
price ($0.115)) from Concept Sports Ltd under the liability provisions
of the Corporations Act, 2001, (Austl.).17
The operative Australian provision covering liability on a
prospectus indicates that if a prospectus omits information that is
required by statute, or if it contains misleading or deceptive
statements that are materially adverse from the point of view of an
investor, the person making the offer will have committed an offence.
115. Cadence Asset Mgmt. Pty Ltd. v. Concept Sports Ltd. (2005) 147 F.C.R. 434.
116. Corporations Act, 2001, § 710 (Austl.).
117. The facts of the case are taken from (2005) 55 A.C.S.R. 145, 146-48
(Finkelstein, J.).
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Any person who suffers loss or damage as a result may, subject to
certain defences, recover that loss or damage from a number of
persons, including the company making the offer."8
Concept Sports Ltd argued that the principle espoused in
Houldsworth precluded any claim by the plaintiff. To claim any
damages while avoiding the effect of the rule in Houldsworth, it
would have been necessary, according to Concept Sports Ltd, for the
plaintiff to rescind the agreement to subscribe for the shares pursuant
to the prospectus so as to recover the full amount of the purchase
price rather than on-sell the shares to a third party and recoup the
loss made on the sale.
At first instance, Justice Finkelstein of the Australian Federal
Court ruled that the rule in Houldsworth had not been abrogated by
the enactment of the prospectus liability provision." 9 Relying upon
the High Court decision in Webb, Justice Finkelstein noted the
following reasons for his conclusions that the reasons for denying the
plaintiff's request for relief were to be preferred over an
interpretation that would allow relief. The factors that Justice
Finkelstein found persuasive were that:
(1) parliament could have, but did not explicitly overturn
Houldsworth (as had been the case in the United
Kingdom);
(2) parliament was aware of Houldsworth and its
consequences, and would have been able to overturn
the implications of the case if it had wished to;
(3) the High Court of Australia had considered a similar
argument in Webb and had rejected, in that case, the
proposition that Parliament had intended to abrogate
Houldswortr, and
(4) certain aspects of Houldsworth (postponing claims of
shareholders in their capacity as shareholders to claims
of creditors) had been enacted by statute, and to
overturn Houldsworth would thus seem to be contradictory
to that provision.
118. Corporations Act, 2001, § 729 (Austl.).
119. Cadence Asset Mgmt. Pty Ltd. v. Concept Sports Ltd. (2005) 55 A.C.S.R. 145,
rev'd, (2005) 56 A.C.S.R. 309.
120. Corporations Act, 2001, § 563A (Austi.).
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Also critical to this decision were that fact that the judgement in
State of Victoria v. Hodgson,2' and the High Court appellate
decision, Webb, were decisions which Justice Finkelstein felt bound
by.
On appeal to the Full Federal Court, the same arguments about
Parliamentary intent resulted in a determination that Parliament had,
in fact, intended to abrogate Houldsworth. The Full Federal Court,
consisting of Justices Merkel, Weinburg, and Kinney, concluded that
the specific provision for liability on a prospectus did intend to
supplant Houldsworth. The Full Federal Court found that supporting
material pointed strongly away from any qualification of the statutory
remedies. In coming to this conclusion, the Full Federal Court
construed the language of the statute in its natural and ordinary
meaning, having regard to its context. This context included other
provisions of the enactment, its history and the state of the law at the
time of the enactment as well as the purpose which the enactment
sought to achieve.
Referring to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the
Bill which had reformulated the prospectus provisions in 1998, the
Full Federal Court indicated that it provided useful commentary,
stating the purpose of the sections was "to ensure that issuers
continue to provide full disclosure in the associated prospectus,
issuers will be liable to investors in relation to the prospectus.' 22
In the view of the Full Federal Court, one of the rationales for
the Houldsworth rule was to prevent shareholders, directly or
indirectly, from receiving back any part of their contribution to the
capital of the company, thereby defeating the interests of creditors.
In contrast to the views of Justice Finkelstein at first instance, the
appellate court indicated that this was now provided for in the
subrogation of shareholders' claims to those of creditors. As a result,
the need for a prohibitive rule such as Houldsworth was no longer
critical to the achievement of that objective."i
Accordingly, the Full Federal Court found no reason for
qualifying by application of the Houldsworth rule a claim to damages
against a company for a deficient prospectus. Consequently, the
121. State of Victoria v. Hodgson (1992) 2 VR 613.
122. Cadence Asset Mgmt. Pty Ltd. v. Concept Sports Ltd. (2005) 147 F.C.R. 434,
444 (citing 8.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program Act, 1999, (Austl.).
123. Id. at 446.
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claim for damages by the plaintiff could proceed even though the
plaintiff had not rescinded its subscription contact and was no longer
capable of doing so.
iii. Sons of Gwalia: The High Court's Views on Houldsworth as
Formerly Applied
Although the Full Federal Court had indicated in Concept Sports
that a company's statutory liability to a shareholder for a misleading
prospectus was not to be constrained by the common law doctrine
expounded in Houldsworth in view of the express statutory provisions
of the Corporations Act, the full consequences of this were
considered by a number of academic authors'24 and were finally
considered by the High Court of Australia early in 2007. The Full
Federal Court had dealt in Concept Sports with shareholders who had
sold at a loss the shares that had been issued to them rather than seek
rescission of the contract of issuance. The shareholders asserted that
they had been misled by the company into investing in its shares by
the company's failure to inform the market of its true financial
position.1 25 According to the plaintiff, the company was aware, at the
time that the plaintiff acquired his shares, that the company had
insufficient gold reserves to meet its gold delivery contracts. Full
disclosure of this information to the market by the company as
required by statute would have prevented the plaintiff from suffering
losses on his shares. Both the Federal Court at first instance'26 and
the Full Federal Court on appeal in Sons of Gwalia indicated that
Houldsworth provided no impediment to a claim by a shareholders
who had acquired the shares on market and who had held those
shares until the company became insolvent.27
In the final appeal of Sons of Gwalia, the High Court of
Australia had to consider as a preliminary issue whether the Full
Federal Court was correct in its view that Houldsworth was of limited
continuing validity. Although not dealing directly with Concept
124. John Tarrant, Continued Erosion of the Rule in Houldsworths Case, 24 Co.
& SEC. L.J. 183 (2006); Paul von Nessen & Rachel Weeks, Words that Come Back to
Haunt: Ensuring Company Prospectuses Comply, 80(12) L.I J. 50 (2006); Camille
Simon, Phillip Stern, & Nicole Tyson, Shareholders as Creditors? The Full Federal
Court's Decisions in Cadence and Sons of Gwalia, 6(8) INSOLV. L BULL 116 (2006).
125. Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 674, 675 (Austl.).
126. Sons of Gwalia Ltd v. Margaretic (2005) 55 A.C.S.R. 365, (2006) 24 A.C.L.C.
244.
127. Sons of Gwalia Ltd v. Margaretic (2006) 149 F.C.R. 227.
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Sports, the High Court clearly determined that Houldsworth did not
prohibit a claim by shareholders who had purchased their shares on
the market (where rescission from the issuing company would not be
possible) where a statutory liability, such as that for failure to inform
the market under continuous disclosure obligations, is prescribed.
Referring to the somewhat problematic decision in Webb, Justice
Hayne provided a justification for allowing the claim, distinguishing
the claims of Mr. Margaretic against Sons of Gwalia Ltd. from the
claims presented in Webb and Houldsworth in the following terms:
The conclusion reached in Webb Distributors concerned, and
concerned only, the rights of a member who had subscribed for
shares, as distinct from having acquired shares by contract from a
person other than the company itself. Maintenance of capital may
be relevant to a shareholder's entitlement to recover from the
company amounts that the shareholder subscribed as capital, but it
has no direct relevance to the recovery from the company of
damages for loss occasioned by the making of a contract to acquire
existing shares in the company from a third party. It has no direct
relevance to that second kind of case because the shareholder does
not seek the return of what was subscribed as capital when the
shares were allotted. Whether, in the first kind of case, it is right to
describe the claim as one which seeks the return of what was
subscribed is a question that need not be answered here. Even if it
were right, it would provide no reason for concluding that a
shareholder like Mr Margaretic, who was not a subscriber, has no
claim against the company under the consumer and investor
protection provisions mentioned at the start of these reasons. Nor
would it provide a reason for concluding that such a shareholder
had no claim for deceit. Neither Webb Distributors nor
Houldsworth established any common law "principle" that no
shareholder, no matter how the shares were acquired, can have a
claim of the kind now in issue against a company whose assets were
to be administered as on a liquidation. The reasoning in those
cases, because it was founded in important respects upon
considerations of preservation of capital, can have no direct
application when the plaintiff shareholder did not subscribe capital.
But whether or not that is so, the asserted common law "principle"
could not deny the operation of the relevant consumer protection
and investor protection provisions. Finally, the conclusion reached
in Webb Distributors, like the conclusion reached in Houldsworth,
turned, in important respects, upon whether the shareholder could
rescind the contract with the company for subscription for shares.
None of these considerations is relevant to the present matters
2008]
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where there was no contract for the acquisition of shares made
between the shareholder, Mr Margaretic, and the company, SOG.'
1
Certain Justices of the High Court also reviewed fully the historic
rationale of Houldsworth as well as the justifications for the High
Court's own previous decision Webb Distributors (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v.
Victoria.' Since considering the decision in Concept Sports was
unnecessary to the decision in Sons of Gwalia, the High Court did not
need to indicate whether it totally agreed with the views expressed in
Concept Sports. Nevertheless, observations by a number of the High
Court Justices would lead to the conclusion that the rationale of the
Full Federal Court decision in Concept Sports, although not
considered directly, would be likely to find support in the High Court
if it were questioned. 30
After determining that Houldsworth did not prohibit a
shareholder from pursuing a statutory claim against his company in
liquidation, the High Court also had to consider whether such claims
were postponed (or deferred to the claims of other creditors) in
liquidation.
B. Ranking Shareholder Claimants as Creditors: The Primary
Significance of the High Court Decision in the Sons of Gwalia
Case
One of the well-accepted tenets of corporate law is that
shareholders provide their capital for shares understanding that they
are exposing themselves to risk of loss, while also being likely to
benefit to the greatest extent if the entity proves to be successful. The
reflection of this tenet is quite straightforward if the corporation is
successful: those providing loan capital normally receive contractually
determined interest returns (the rate of which will normally vary
depending upon the extent to which the loan is fully secured, with less
secure, higher risk loans usually receiving higher returns); preferred
shareholders usually have first priority to the payment of dividends
from profits, often in amount and return only slightly higher than
secured creditors (with their full rights to such dividends and the
rights which arise in default of such declaration included within the
corporate constituent documents and the terms of issue); and
ordinary or common shareholders to participate (as provided in the
128. Sons of Gwalia Ltd v. Margaretic (2007) 232 A.L.R. 232, 281-82.
129. Webb Distributors (Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. Victoria (1993) 117 A.L.R. 321.
130. The actual decision in Concept Sports was not the subject of appeal.
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corporate constituent documents) in any remaining profits to the
extent that dividends are declared by the corporation.
Despite the prospect of high returns in the event of success,
ordinary or common shareholders usually face higher risk than
creditors in the event that the corporation is unsuccessful. In
insolvency (or bankruptcy as it is known in the United States),
shareholders normally are the last group to receive payment. As a
result, while shareholders are the group to benefit to the greatest
extent in the event of success, their capital contributions are the first
to be exhausted in the event of failure. However, it is far too
simplistic to say that "members come last" in liquidation,"' for the
types of claims which members can assert are not limited only to the
capital contributed for the issuance of shares. The landmark case
concerning the separate legal personality doctrine in English law,
Saloman v. Solman & Co. Ltd.,3 ' itself approved the elevation of part
of a member's contribution to the status of secured creditor as a result
of the execution of a debenture by the company in his favour (leading
inevitably to the persistent problem of thinly capitalized companies).
The Australian provision of relevance, Corporations Act Section
563A, based through a number of prior iterations upon section 38(7)
of the Companies Act 1862 (U.K.), recognizes that a member can
have many types of claims against the company and states simply:
Payment of a debt owed by a company to a person in the person's
capacity as a member of the company, whether by way of
dividends, profits or otherwise, is to be postponed until all debts
owed to, or claims made by, persons otherwise than as members of
the company have been satisfied.
The High Court consequently had to determine whether a
statutory claim by a member against the company arising from the
company's failure to meet its continuous disclosure obligations was a
debt owed to that person in his capacity as a member of the company.
By direct contrast, the equivalent provision in the United States
Bankruptcy Code dealing with claims by shareholders, is far more
certain:
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from
131. See, for example, the judgments in Sons of Gwalia of Gleason CJ, 232 A.L.R.
232 at 19 and Kirby J., 232 A.L.R. 232 at 118. Both indicate that such a general
policy has not been adopted.
132. Saloman v. Solman & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22.
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rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an
affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase or
sale of such a security, or for reimbursement or contribution
allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be
subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the
claim or interest represented by such security, except that if such
security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as
common stock.133
While the majority of the High Court Justices resolved the issue
of whether the Australian provision should be interpreted to require
postponement of such claims by reference to statutory interpretive
techniques, including a review of the purpose and history of the
legislation,3 ' the economic relevance of the issue was succinctly
summarized by Justice Kirby (who himself agreed that the express
terms of the legislation did not support this policy view):
35
One can readily conceive why, as a matter of policy, strong
arguments can be mounted that claims by persons such as the
respondent should be postponed to claims made by the general
creditors of the insolvent company. Putting it broadly, most general
creditors, although not all, will be innocent of the business and
entrepreneurial decisions of the company that led to its insolvency.
Most will have dealt with the company as outsiders in good faith on
the basis of its incorporation and, where applicable, its listing on
the stock exchange and its subjection to regular and rigorous legal
obligations. On the other hand, persons such as the respondent are
investors. As such, they are not involved in the provision of goods
and services to the company, as ordinary creditors generally are.
Their interest in membership of the company is with a view to their
own individual profit. Necessarily, their investment in the company
involves risks, albeit risks increasingly informed by mandatory
disclosures. In particular, where, as here, the company was involved
in the extraction of gold, the acquisition of which notoriously and
historically involves substantial risks and a significant degree of
chance, the purchase of shares will commonly entail a measure -
even a high measure - of speculation. Such speculation would
ordinarily be expected to fall on the shareholders themselves, not
shared with general creditors who would thereby end up
136
underwriting the investors' speculative risks.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2006).
134. See in particular the judgment of Justice Hayne, 232 A.L.R. 232, 272 et. seq.
135. Sons of Gwalia Ltd v. Margaretic (2007) 232 A.L.R. 232,263 at T 113.
136. Id. at T 109.
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The majority of the High Court (Justice Callinan being the lone
dissenter) concluded on the basis of the legislation itself, that the
claims made by the plaintiff were claims which any person,
shareholder or not, could make if they had suffered loss or damage as
a result of the company's conduct (which was misleading and
deceptive). The claim was therefore not the payment of a debt to a
person in his capacity as a member. In consequence of this
conclusion, the plaintiff's claims were not postponed to those of other
general creditors.
The scope of the actual decision in Sons of Gwalia was somewhat
limited, relying heavily upon the specific statutory application of the
term "debts owed to a person in his capacity as shareholder" in
Corporations Act Section 563A to this plaintiff's specific claims.'37
Given the views of the High Court in reaching its decision, however,
the implications of the decision are likely to be significant."' Plaintiffs
who have suffered loss in acquiring shares as a result of a company's
statutory breaches may make a claim in liquidation which ranks
equally with other creditors irrespective of the fact that they have
become shareholders through their acquisition. It appears that
similar logic would apply to a shareholder who had purchased the
shares on the market or from the company itself,'39 and that there
would be no necessity for the shareholder to cease being a
shareholder prior to the commencement of winding up for a loss to
have occurred."4 In their ultimate conclusion, the High Court cast
137. As commented upon by Justice Hayne, "the questions that must be
considered in these matters are questions of statutory construction." 232 A.L.R. 232,
271 at 148.
138. See, for example, Jason Harris & Anil Hargovan, Sons of Gwalia: navigating
the line between membership and creditor rights in corporate insolvencies, 25 Co. &
SEC. L.J. 7, 20-21 (2007); Cara Waters, The new class conflict: the efficacy of class
actions as a remedy for minority shareholders, 25 Co. & SEC. L.J. 300, 303 (2007);
Scott Wotherspoon, Property by any other name: the problem with shareholder
claims in Australia, 81 AUSTL. L. J. 75 (2007).
139. In the view of Justice Hayne, for example, "... no distinction is to be drawn
between shareholders who complain that a company's deceit or misleading or
deceptive conduct induced them to acquire shares in the company according to
whether that acquisition was by subscription or transfer." 232 A.L.R. 232, 271 at 91
206.
140. Although this was the case in Sons of Gwalia, more interesting is the issue of
whether the retention of shares by a long standing shareholder caused by misleading
and deceptive conduct by the company, if successfully proved, would also be a loss
which could be claimed. It would appear that such claim, if successful, might also
rank the shareholder as a creditor; however, this point was not decided in Sons of
Gwalia. See the announcement by the Parliamentary Secretary, supra note 143,
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significant doubt upon the continuing validity of Webb Distributors
(Aust) Pty Ltd v. Victoria'' and Houldsworth, while lending support
to the approach adopted by the House of Lords in Soden v. British &
Common wealth Holdings Plc.
142
As might be expected, the High Court decision in Sons of Gwalia
caused some degree of concern about the radical departure from the
common understanding about the priority of claims in insolvency.
Numerous, if not all, shareholders might be able to mount some claim
against their company in insolvency based upon their decision to
retain shares as a result of improper information being provided to
them at some point during the holding of their investment. Unlike
the developments in the United States limiting class actions,
shareholder and otherwise, the decision in Sons of Gwalia was
primarily based upon statutory interpretation rather than legislative
policy determinations.
To consider whether the possible blanket elevation in practical
terms of shareholders to equal ranking with creditors was consistent
with Parliamentary policy objectives, the Parliamentary Secretary, the
Hon. Chris Pearce, referred the matter to the Corporations and
Markets Advisory Committee on February 7, 2005.' By the terms of
reference the Advisory Committee was to report to Government
whether such shareholder claims should be dealt with as in the United
States'" and Canada'45 or retain the post-Sons-of-Gwalia position
(similar to that allowed in the United Kingdom).' 6
The discussion paper of the Corporations and Markets Advisory
Committee was released in September 2007.' ' 7 In it, the Corporations
and Markets Advisory Committee posited three possible responses to
the Sons of Gwalia decision:
(1) Make no legislative change and continue with the
wherein he alludes to this possibility.
141. Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Victoria (1993) 179 C.L.R. 15.
142. Soden v. British & Commonwealth Holdings Plc., [1998] A.C. 298.
143. The referral is available at: <http://www.camac.gov.au/
camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFReference/$file/RefSons_oLGwalia.pdf>.
144. The Australian perspective of the United States position is discussed in
Hargovan and Harris, supra note 13.
145. Re Blue Range Resource Corp. (2000) 94 A.C.W.S. (3d) 223; Nat. Bank of
Canada v. Merit Energy Ltd. [2001] 294 A.R. 15, aff'd [2002] 299 A.R. 200.
146. Companies Act, 1985, ch. 6, § llA (Eng.) repealed by Companies Act 2006,
ch. 46, § 1295 (Eng.).
147. Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, supra note 13.
[Vol. 31:2
2008] Australian Shareholders Rejoice 683
position now adopted by the High Court;
(2) Legislatively reverse the effect of the Sons of Gwalia
decision by postponing the claims of aggrieved
investors so that their claims would rank behind those
of unsecured creditors and equally with other member
claimants; or
(3) Legislatively modify the effect of the Sons of Gwalia
decision by postponing the claims of aggrieved
investors so that their claims would rank behind those
of unsecured creditors but would rank ahead of those
of other member claimants.'48
For now, at least, Australian shareholders, like their United
Kingdom counterparts, have much greater protection in law, as a
result of Sons of Gwalia, than do their United States equivalents.
However, the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee invited
submissions to consider whether aligning the Australian and United
Kingdom positions was appropriate in light of material differences
between the legal environments in the United Kingdom and
Australia.'4 9 One major difference identified by the Committee was
the availability of class actions in Australia. The second major
difference identified the broader availability of funding for
litigation,' ° now greatly improved in Australia as a result of the Fostif
case, discussed below.
C. The Funding of Actions as an Alternative to Contingency
Fees: the Fostif case
As in the United Kingdom and the remainder of the common
law world, Australia does not provide for contingency fee litigation."'
Like the United Kingdom, three of the Australian States have
allowed for uplift factors to compensate for actions which are
somewhat speculative, these factors are allowed to exceed the
standard hourly fees by a smaller percentage than is allowed in the
148. Id. at 61.
149. Id. at 58.
150. Id.
151. See generally Stephan Landsman, The History of Contingency and the
Contingency of lHstory, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 261 (1998); see also Gregory E. Maggs
& Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney's Fees. Expanding the "Loser Pays"Rule
in Texas, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1915 (1994).
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United Kingdom.'52 The fees are not calculated by reference to the
amount of recovery or settlement, but rather on the standard rates
charged by legal practitioners. Even these uplift factors are under
review, with New South Wales recently eliminating its approval of
uplift factors for actions involving damages. As a result of this
inability of legal practitioners to be compensated on a contingency fee
basis, speculative litigation was quite limited in Australia when
compared to litigation practice in the United States. In the recently
decided Fostif case, the High Court of Australia approved of a
significant alternative to contingency fees.
In Fosti, the High Court of Australia considered a number of
representative actions brought in the New South Wales Supreme
Court. These actions were brought by a number of retailers for the
recovery of tobacco license fees, subsequently declared invalid, which
had been paid prior to the invalidation by the retailers to wholesalers.
Each plaintiff had brought an action on behalf of itself and a class of
unnamed persons, in the originating petition. Applying the stricter
test for representative actions found in New South Wales Supreme
Court Rules, Pt. 8, rule 13(1) the High Court confirmed that the cases
were not appropriate representative actions because, unlike in the
Esanda case, the pleading indicated that the action was brought by
the plaintiff and others who decided to opt in. Subsequent to the
initiating pleadings, no other person had agreed to join these actions;
the plaintiff's assertion that the case was brought on behalf of
numerous others with the same interests in the proceeding could not
be sustained. For this reason, none of the actions were actually
brought on behalf of numerous persons and consequently none were
allowed to continue as representative actions. While the Fostif case,
brought in New South Wales, highlights the deficiencies of the
representative action in contrast to class action proceedings, perhaps
more interesting was the High Court's consideration the efficacy of
the funding arrangements under which the actions were brought.
152. In New South Wales, conditional costs agreements may provide for a 25
percent uplift, but this no longer applies to actions for damages, Legal Profession
Act, 2004, ch. 3, § 324 (N.S.W.), Victoria continues to allow a 25 percent uplift on
conditional cost agreements, Legal Profession Act, 2004, ch. 3, § 3.4.14 (Vic.).
Queensland allows the greatest uplift factor in Australia, Queensland at 50 percent,
Queensland at 50%, Queensland Barristers' Rules 121. England and Wales now
allow for a 100 percent uplift, see Court and Legal Services Act 1990, ch. 41, § 58
(Eng.); see generally also Peter Melamed, An Alternative to the Contingent Fee?An
Assessment of the Incentive Effects of the English Conditional Fee Arrangement, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2433 (2006).
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Although Fostif was an appropriate plaintiff (a retailer seeking a
refund of a tobacco tax unpaid by a wholesaler), the action was
actually paid for by Firmstones. Firmstones, whose sole director was
Mr Adrian Firmstone, traded as "Firmstone & Feil, Consultants." It
provided "advice and assistance in relation to indirect tax matters,
including with respect to the recovery for tobacco retailers of
amounts referable to state tobacco licence fees paid by tobacco
retailers to tobacco wholesalers." '53  During 2002, Firmstones
encouraged tobacco retailers to claim a refund of the tobacco license
fees paid to wholesalers because those wholesalers had not remitted
the tax (ruled to be invalid) to the relevant taxing authority.
Firmstones wrote to tobacco retailers asking for authority to act on
their behalf in recovering these amounts, and the letters indicated
that there would be a "success fee" of 33 1/3 percent of any money
received by the retailer from the tobacco wholesaler. If costs (legal
costs related to the successful party's litigation) were awarded to the
retailer, Firmstones indicated that it would retain the sum awarded;
but if costs were awarded against the retailer, Firmstones indicated
that it would bear those costs.154  The High Court thus had to
determine whether such an arrangement (litigation funding) was
contrary to the prohibitions of maintenance and champerty or
otherwise an abuse of the judicial process.
In resolving the issues raised by the litigation funding, the High
Court reviewed the common law prohibitions on maintenance and
champerty, considered the effect of New South Wales legislation
which abolished those common law offences,"5 5 and then expressed its
view on the public policy considerations applying to such agreements.
Perhaps most interesting of these aspects were the views expressed by
the High Court in relation to application of such agreements to "class
actions" and the evils which had arisen in the United States.
It was acknowledged by the High Court that prohibitions on
maintenance and champerty had been traced as far back as 1275 in
England . Despite this longstanding prohibition on maintenance
(the act of assisting the plaintiff in any legal proceeding in which the
person giving the assistance had no valuable interest) and champerty
153. Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v. Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 A.L.R. 58, 64.
154. The facts are more fully described in the judgment.
155. See generally Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act, 1993
(N.S.W.).
156. A. H. Dennis, The Law of Maintenance and Cbamperty, 6 LAW Q. REV. 169,
171 (1890).
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(maintenance where the maintainor has an agreement to share in the
proceeds of the suit), 157 the policy justification was poorly articulated
and subject to numerous exceptions (the exceptions to maintenance,
for example, were based upon the maintainor's charitable motives or
some kind of relationship with the plaintiff):'58
What this brief and incomplete survey of the state of the English
law, as it stood by the early years of the twentieth century, may be
understood as revealing is that the law of maintenance and
champerty depended more upon assertion of consequences said to
follow from the existence of the common law criminal offences of
maintenance and champerty than it did upon any close analysis or
clear exposition of the policy to which the rules were intended to
give effect.59
Irrespective of the policy justifications for the common law
offences of maintenance and champerty, the State of New South
Wales had abolished the common law offences in 1993 with the
Maintenance, Champerty and Barratry Abolition Act. 16° Nevertheless,
the High Court noted that the legislation itself did not explicitly deal
with whether maintenance and champerty continued to be relevant to
issues of abuse of process nor with the scope that should be given to
public policy or the doctrine of illegality once the conduct in question
is no longer criminal or tortious."6' The High Court accepted the
validity of the observation that there was no case where maintenance
or champerty was held to be a defence to, or reason enough to stay,
the action that was maintained. In relation to the argument
concerning public policy, the High Court concluded that Firmstone's
seeking out those who may have had claims, Firmstone's control of
the litigation and Firmstone's expected profit from the litigation did
not, either alone or in combination, warrant condemnation as being
contrary to public policy.'62
The High Court concluded that neither fears about the adverse
effect on the process of litigation nor fears about the fairness of the
157. Campbell Cash & Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif, Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 A.L.R. 58, n.
59 (Austl.) (hereinafter, "Fostif"), citing SIR JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A DIGEST
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS) 86 (4th ed. 1877).
158. Percy H. Winfield, The History of Maintenance and Champerty, 35 LAW Q.
REV. 50, 65 (1919).
159. Fostif, supra note 157, at 78.
160. Seenote 155.
161. Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v. Fostif Pty Ltd. (2006) 229 A.L.R. 58, 74-5.
162. Id. at 81.
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bargain struck by the litigant and the litigation funders warranted
formulation of an overarching policy that would bar the prosecution
of an action in such cases. To meet such fears, either by adopting a
rule preventing the provision of funds in exchange for a share of the
proceeds of litigation or imposing standards on the nature and degree
of control or reward the funding party might obtain, would "take too
broad an axe to the problems that may be seen to lie behind the
fears."'63
Despite deciding that litigation funding was not necessarily
abusive of public policy, the High Court's judgment in Fostif further
provides evidence that the spectre of misuse of class actions in the
United States continues to concern judicial thought in Australia.
While the implications of broader access to litigation funding in
Australia are significant," the Australian High Court also
acknowledged the emergence of possible abuses of process which
have been addressed in the United States. It indicated that it was
comfortable that such abuses could be addressed if and when they
arose in Australia:
The appellants submitted that special considerations intrude in
"class actions" because, so it was submitted, there is the risk that
such proceedings may be used to achieve what, in the United
States, are sometimes referred to as "blackmail settlements".65
However, as remarked earlier in these reasons, the rules governing
representative or group proceedings vary greatly between courts
and it is not useful to speak of "class actions" as identifying a single,
distinct kind of proceedings. Even when regulated by similar rules
of procedure, each proceeding in which one or more named
plaintiffs represent the interests of others will present different
issues and different kinds of difficulty.
The difficulties thought to inhere in the prosecution of an action
which, if successful, would produce a large award of damages but
which, to defend, would take a very long time and very large
resources, is a problem that the courts confront in many different
circumstances, not just when the named plaintiffs represent others
163. Id. at 83.
164. See generally Alwyn Narayan, Litigation Funding, 15 INSOLV. L. J. 128
(2007); see also Bernard Murphy & Camille Cameron, Access to Justice and the
Elevation of the Class Action Litigation in Australia, 30 MELB. U. L. REV. 30 (2006);
Lee Aitkin, "Litigation Lending" After Fostif" An Advance in Consumer Protection,
or a License to 'Bottomfeeders [sic]'?, 28 SYD. L. REv. 171 (2006).
165. In the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., et. al., 51 F. 3d 1293, 1298 (1995)
citing H J FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973).
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and not just when named plaintiffs receive financial support from
third-party funders. The solution to that problem (if there is one)
does not lie in treating actions financially supported by third parties
differently from other actions. And if there is a particular aspect of
the problem that is to be observed principally in actions where a
plaintiff represents others, that is a problem to be solved, in the first
instance, through the procedures that are employed in that kind of
action. It is not to be solved by identifying some general rule of
public policy that a defendant may invoke to prevent determination
of the claims that are made against that defendant.' 66
VI. Securities Class Actions: Greenfield for
Australian Law?
It would appear that removing the barriers to damage suits
against Australian corporations would make class actions, particularly
those based upon defective prospectuses and continuous disclosure
failure, quite attractive. 1  Undoubtedly, the aggregation of such
claims into a class action would assure that members of the class of
plaintiffs who had suffered loss insufficient to warrant individual
action would, through use of a class action, be able to participate in
any recovery. For straightforward disclosure failures, the benefits of
having one litigation would seem obvious. Concentrating upon the
hypothetical case where a number of shareholders have all suffered
loss as a result of misleading and deceptive statements in a
prospectus, a class action would clearly advance the articulated policy
objectives supporting the Australian class action:
(1) It will provide access to the courts for shareholders
despite that fact that each shareholder's loss may be
small and not economically viable to recover in
individual actions.
(2) It will allow the Courts to deal efficiently with the
situation and will allow that group of shareholders,
166. Fostif, supra note 157, at 83.
167. Although more attractive than prior to 2007, class actions still remain more
attractive in the United States than in Australia in many circumstances. See Clark,
supra note 8, at 140. It is noteworthy that those who had suffered as a result of
sanctions evasion in Iraq by the Australian Wheat Board commenced class action
proceedings in the United States rather than Australia whereas shareholders have
instituted action in Australia for continuous disclosure breaches against the company.
Peter Veness & Kaaren Morrissey, Saddam Victims Sue A WB, THE [BRISBANE]
COURIER MAIL, Sept. 2007 at 14.
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even if the damages were large enough to justify
individual actions, to obtain redress and do so more
cheaply.' 68
While the advantages of the class action in such circumstances is
clear, a more difficult question is whether abuse of the class action in
Australia will turn it from a saviour to a pest, resulting in frivolous
actions instigated by entrepreneurial lawyers. Such actions, it is
feared, might be brought merely for the prospect of settlement by
defendant corporations to avoid litigation costs and to avoid court
sanctioned "fishing expeditions" where plaintiff lawyers troll through
vast amounts of material seeking information which would justify
their actions. The fear of entrepreneurial advocates is widespread,
and was recently expressed by Justice Callinan of the High Court of
Australia:
The problems to which I have just referred are likely to be
aggravated by the increasingly competitive entrepreneurial
activities of lawyers undertaking the conduct of class or group
actions, in which, in a practical sense, the lawyers are often as much
the litigants as the plaintiffs themselves, and with the same or even
a greater stake in the outcome than any member of the group. This
reality is likely to be productive of a multiplicity of group actions
throughout the country.1 69
Previously mitigating greatly against a broad use of class action
litigation in Australia was the absence of any effective contingency
fee arrangement for legal practitioners and the system of awarding
costs against the losing party (known in the United States as the
"English rule").17" In the United States, unsuccessful plaintiffs may
incur no legal fees if they have engaged their lawyers on a
contingency fee basis; however, the same would not always be true in
Australia (although various plaintiff law firms do occasionally operate
on a no win no fee basis). More importantly, the legal fees of the
opposing party, as verified by independent assessors based upon a
costing schedule, may be recovered from the party which has lost the
action. For this reason, unnecessary or burdensome litigation activity
will eventually be borne by the unsuccessful party to the litigation,
168. These objectives were stated in the Reading Speech, supra note 82.
169. Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd. v. Victoria (2002) 211 C.L.R. 1, 77.
170. Philip J. Havers, Take the Money and Run: Inherent Ethical Problems of the
Contingency Fee and Loser Pays Systems, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 621, 633 (2000).
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including potentially the plaintiffs to the class action. Further adding
to the discouragement of frivolous class actions is the ability of
defendants to seek security for costs, thereby requiring plaintiffs to
provide financial undertakings sufficient to cover the litigation costs
of defendants should the defendants succeed in their defence.
The use of funding litigators, which is now permitted in Australia
following the Fostifdecision, apparently eliminates both impediments
to the use of speculative class actions. Not only will the litigation
funder agree to engage lawyers to pursue the action (for which the
litigation funder will be liable), but also the agreement can provide
that the injured party will not be liable to the litigation funder in the
event that the case is unsuccessful and costs are awarded against that
litigation funder. In economic terms, the litigation funder serves as a
gatekeeper, assessing the potential likelihood of success, factoring in
their own legal costs as well as the possible benefits or detriments of
an award of costs in their favour (in the event of success) or against
them (in the event of failure)."'
A final impediment to a more extensive use of class actions in
Australia is a somewhat antagonistic attitude of many of the
Australian judiciary to its use. This attitude has been reflected in
interpretations which make the use of class actions much more
difficult than might be expected. For example, in King v. General
Insurance Office 72 the Australian class action procedure was
interpreted to require that the lead plaintiff in a class action and each
of its members would have to plead a claim against each and every
respondent. Another example of this unreceptive attitude toward
class action can be seen in the judicial response to one attempt by
plaintiff lawyers to overcome the difficulties of bringing a class action.
An assertion that a class of plaintiffs could be limited to those
members represented by one law firm (intended to ease the
difficulties of funding the litigation and meeting possible costs
awards) was rejected as inappropriate.173  As a result of such
developments, it is easy to understand why it might be said that
Australia, at least in relation to some aspects of class actions claims,
could be "heading back in the direction of 1852" by throwing up
171. IMF Australia Ltd. and Hillcrest Litigation Services Ltd., both litigation-
funding firms, are now listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Clearly, investors
place some faith in their ability to serve as commercially successful gatekeepers.
172. King v. General Insurance Office (2000) 100 F.C.R. 209.
173. Dorajay Pty Ltd v. Aristocrat Leisure Ltd. (2005) 147 F.C.R. 394, 431 (Stone,
J.).
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unnecessary hurdles to their pursuit.'74 These comments, made in
2003, seem overly pessimistic in light of the Fostifcase.
While one might argue that in Australia class actions will be
unlikely to become the tool of unworthy litigants willing to bring
actions without any genuine prospects of success, the recent High
Court decisions make the prospect of more frequent use of class
actions in Australia more likely. The High Court of Australia is
aware of the possibility that class actions could be used abusively, and
it is clear from the observations of Justice Kirby in the Fostifcase that
misuse of the legal system by the abusive actions will be dealt with
when it becomes apparent:
... common law courts in England and in the Australian colonies
provided remedies against abuse of a court's processes. Such
remedies are flexible. They adapt to new times and new
circumstances. Moreover, in particular cases, by particular statutory
language, Parliaments can sometimes state where the balance of
public interest lies [citations omitted]75
Other United States legal transplants have proved to be more
successful than might originally have been anticipated,176 but one can
only hope that the Australian judiciary's removal of impediments to
securities class actions discussed in this article (each justifiable in
isolation) will not result in the abusive security class actions that were
perceived as so problematic in the United States. Legislative
intervention in Australia to reset policy in relation to shareholder
claims and class action procedures may ultimately modify the judicial
developments of 2007, but until then, it would seem that the United
States and Australia, for the moment, are proceeding in different
directions in relation to the support of shareholder litigation.
174. The comments of Justice Merkel in Bray v. Hoffman- La Roche Ltd. (2003)
130 F.C.R. 317 concerned the requirements of King v. Gen. Ins. Office, supra note
172. The issue of defining a class by its legal representative was not being commented
upon.
175. Fostif, supra note 157, at 111 (Kirby, J.).
176. See Paul von Nessen, The Americanization of Australian Corporate Law, 26
SYRACUSE J. OF INTL. L. AND COMM. 239 (1999).
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